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Abstract: One of the challenging problems in digital image forensics is the capability to identify images that are captured
by the same camera device. This knowledge can help forensic experts in gathering intelligence about suspects
by analyzing digital images. In this paper, we propose a two-part network to quantify the likelihood that a given
pair of images have the same source camera, and we evaluated it on the benchmark Dresden data set containing
1851 images from 31 different cameras. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones addressing the
challenge of device-based image matching. Though the proposed approach is not yet forensics ready, our
experiments show that this direction is worth pursuing, achieving at this moment 85 percent accuracy. This
ongoing work is part of the EU-funded project 4NSEEK concerned with forensics against child sexual abuse.
1 INTRODUCTION
With the rapid adoption and consumption of digital
content, there have been many instances of illicit ma-
terial of children being circulated on the Internet, es-
pecially in the darknet. Today, law enforcement agen-
cies (LEAs) require forensic tools which can help
them to investigate more effectively and efficiently
such digital content. The EU-funded 4NSEEK project
1 , to which this work belongs, is aimed to develop a
forensic tool by various partners in the industry and
academia with the cooperation of police agencies in
the European Union. The project is focused on fight-
ing against child sexual abuse and the distribution of
its contents across the internet. One desired function-
ality is device-based image matching, that is the de-
termination whether any two or more seized images
were captured by the same camera device. Here we
report the ongoing work in this direction.
a https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8434-9271
b https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2081-774X
c https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8827-2590
d https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6552-2596
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Just as the bullet traces in a crime scene become
a piece of evidence for a weapon, a digital image
can become an evidence for a camera. This is pos-
sible when we can extract fingerprints from images
that (uniquely) characterize the source camera device.
Extraction and identification of these fingerprints be-
come more challenging when the photographs are
subject to compression, post-processing, and compu-
tational photography, among others. Every process-
ing step that alters the original RAW image, includ-
ing the operations that are performed on the captured
image within the camera, plays a role in altering the
fingerprint. Together with the increasing use of im-
age processing tools, the extraction of fingerprints be-
comes even more challenging.
The camera signature is embedded in the captured
image in the form of noise and some artefacts. Our
goal is to extract these fingerprints from given images
and use them to determine whether the concerned im-
ages were captured by the same camera device. We
would like to bring out a subtle difference between
the terms camera model and camera device, with
the former referring the type of camera (e.g. Nikon
D200) and the latter refers to a specific manufactured
device (e.g. Nikon D200 - 1, where the last digit
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represents the unique identifier for the manufactured
Nikon D200 devices). In this work, we address image
matching by using signatures of the source camera de-
vices.
More formally, the problem that we address in this
work is the following: given a pair of images, how
likely are they were both captured using the same
camera device. We restrict our analysis and discus-
sions to the publicly available Dresden (Gloe and
Bo¨hme, 2010) image data set. We propose a con-
volutional neural network (CNN) based architecture
which is in line with the design of the CNN proposed
by Mayer and Stamm (2018) for camera model iden-
tification.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We
start by presenting an overview of the traditional and
state-of-the-art approaches in Section 2. In Section 3,
we describe the approach for feature extraction and
classification of the proposed source camera identi-
fication. Experimental results along with the dataset
description are provided in Section 4. We provide a
discussion of certain aspects of the proposed work in
Section 5 and finally, we draw conclusions in Sec-
tion 6.
2 RELATEDWORK
The camera signature is embedded in the captured
image in the form of noise and some artefacts. In
Figure 1 we illustrate a hierarchical representation of
noise classification which we adopt from Luka´sˇ et al.
(2006). Even when the camera sensor is exposed to
a uniformly lit scene the resulting image pixels are
not uniform. This non-uniformity is caused due to
shot noise and pattern noise. Shot noise is a temporal
random noise and varies from frame to frame. This
component of noise can be suppressed to a large ex-
tent by frame averaging. Pattern noise is defined as
any noise component that survives frame averaging
(Holst, 1998). This stability and uniqueness over time
makes pattern noise a candidate for camera signature.
The two main components of pattern noise are
FPN (fixed pattern noise) and PRNU (photo response
non-uniform noise). The FPN is an additive noise
which is a consequence of dark currents (Holst,
1998). Dark currents are responsible for pixel-to-
pixel differences when the sensor is not exposed to
any light. Some modern digital cameras do offer long
exposure noise reduction that automatically subtracts
a dark frame from the captured image. This helps in
removing the FPN artefacts from the captured image.
This is, however, not a de-facto standard and is not
implemented by all consumer camera manufacturers.
Figure 1: Topology of digital camera sensor noise. Note
that only FPN (Fixed Pattern Noise) and PNU (Pixel Non-
uniformity Noise), which are highlighted in yellow, contain
the fingerprint that can be used to uniquely identify a sensor.
PRNU is further classified into PNU (pixel non-
uniformity noise) and noise caused by low frequency
defects. PNU noise is mainly caused due to imper-
fections and defects introduced into the sensor during
the semiconductor wafer fabrication process. This in-
homogeneity results in different sensitivity of pixels
to light. The nature of PNU is such that even the
sensors that are fabricated from the same wafer ex-
hibit different PNU patterns. As mentioned by Luka´sˇ
et al. (2006), light refraction on dust particles, op-
tical surfaces, and zoom settings also contribute to
PRNU noise. These low frequency components are
not characteristic of the sensor, hence they should be
discarded when capturing the noise profile for a sen-
sor from its image.
2.1 Traditional Approaches
To the best of our knowledge, one of the earliest pub-
lished works in camera detection was done by Geradts
et al. (2001). The authors showed that every CCD
(charge coupled device) sensor exhibits few random
pixels which are defective. These pixels can be iden-
tified under controlled temperatures. Repeated ex-
periments showed that the location of such defective
pixels always remain the same. The authors built a
probabilistic model based on the location of defec-
tive pixels. The detection of such pixels is then left
to visual inspection. Kharrazi et al. (2004) proposed
34 handcrafted features combined with an SVM clas-
sifier (Chang and Lin, 2011) to distinguish between
images taken by Nikon E-2100, Sony DSC-P51, and
Canon (S100, S110, S200) cameras. The authors ex-
tracted these features from both spatial and wavelet
domains and carried out their experiments on a pro-
prietary data set.
Kurosawa et al. (1999) were the first to consider
FPN for source sensor identification. They estab-
lished that this type of noise exhibits itself in images
and is unique for each camera. The authors observed
that the power of FPN is much less than the random
noise. Hence, in order to suppress random noise and
highlight FPN, they averaged 100 dark frames, which
were captured by covering the camera lens. They per-
formed experiments on nine different cameras, eight
cameras of which exhibited FPN while the CCD-
TRV90 Sony camera did not. Luka´sˇ et al. (2006) have
extended on this work by factoring in PRNU noise in
addition to the FPN. For each camera under investi-
gation the authors generated a reference pattern noise,
which serves as a unique identification fingerprint for
the camera. The reference pattern is generated by av-
eraging the noise obtained from multiple images us-
ing a denoising filter. The novelty of that approach
is the generation of a camera signature without hav-
ing access to the camera. Finally, the correlation was
used to establish the similarity between the query and
reference patterns.
Li (2010) studied the noise patterns and observed
that the scene details have stronger signal compo-
nents while the true camera noise has weaker signals.
Hence, the stronger noise signal components in the
residual image should be less trustworthy. Based on
this observation, an enhanced noise fingerprint is ex-
tracted by assigning less significant weights to strong
components of the noise signal.
A variety of techniques have been proposed which
account for CFA (color filter arrays) demosaicing
artefacts. These methods identify the source camera
of an image based on the traces left behind by the pro-
prietary interpolation algorithm used for each digital
camera. Notable among these works include those by
Bayram et al. (2005); Swaminathan et al. (2007), and
more recent one by Chen and Stamm (2015).
2.2 Approaches based on Deep
Learning
In the last few years, deep learning based approaches
have also been applied in the field of image forensics.
Several CNN-based systems have been proposed to
detect traces of image inpainting (Zhu et al., 2018),
effects of image resizing and compression (Bayar and
Stamm, 2017), and median filtering detection (Chen
et al., 2015), among other image forensic tasks.
Researchers have additionally proposed to apply
CNNs for the identification of source cameras of
given images (Tuama et al., 2016; Bondi et al., 2016).
Most of the deep learning algorithms follow an ap-
proach of extracting noise patterns by suppressing the
scene content. Interestingly, the first deep learning
architectures for image denoising are inspired by the
work in steganalysis (Qian et al., 2015). This is a
technique that adds a first layer with a high pass filter
which could either be fixed or trainable (Bayar and
Stamm, 2016). Zhang et al. (2017) were the first ones
to successfully do residual learning by a deep archi-
tecture. Residual learning is useful for camera sensor
identification because the camera signature is often
embedded in the residual images, which are obtained
by subtracting the scene content from an image. The
authors, proposed a deep CNN model that was able
to handle unknown levels of additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN). The CNN model was effective in sev-
eral image denoising tasks, as opposed to traditional
model-based designs (Kharrazi et al., 2004), which
focused on detecting specific forensic traces.
The drawbacks of many of the proposed ap-
proaches are that they target specific types of forensic
traces. For example, researchers have proposed meth-
ods that exclusively target CFA interpolation arte-
facts, chromatic aberration, assume a fixed level of
Gaussian noise, and more. This is not an ideal as-
sumption when developing real world applications for
forensic investigators. Here, we work with an open set
of forensic traces.
The works which are very close to the ideas we
propose are those by Cozzolino and Verdoliva (2019)
and Mayer and Stamm (2018). Both approaches fol-
low an open set of camera models. Many approaches
that rely only on a closed set of camera models rely
on prior knowledge from the source camera models.
It looks almost impossible to use all existing camera
models for training such models, and moreover, the
scalability of such systems could be a challenge.
Cozzolino and Verdoliva (2019) designed a CNN
which extracts a camera model fingerprint (as an im-
age residue) known as the noiseprint. The authors use
the CNN architecture proposed by Qian et al. (2015)
and trained it in a Siamese configuration to highlight
the camera-model artefacts. Their work primarily fo-
cused on the extraction of noiseprint for camera mod-
els and on detecting image forgeries.
The CNN architecture that we adopt in our work
is inspired by the work of Mayer and Stamm (2019).
The authors have proposed a system called forensic
similarity which determines if two image patches con-
tain the same forensic traces or not. They proposed a
two-part network. The first one is a feature extractor
and the second part is a similarity network, which de-
termines if two features come from the same source
camera model. Patch-based systems do not account
for the spatial locality. Therefore, instead of rely-
ing only on the patches our proposed system takes
the whole image for feature extraction. By consid-
ering the whole image the network has the possibility
to learn the spatial locality in addition to the sensor
pattern noise.
3 PROPOSED APPROACH
Figure 2: Proposed workflow.
The proposed method compares two input images and
generates a score indicating the similarity between the
source camera devices that took the concerned im-
ages. In Figure 2 we depict the high level workflow
of the proposed method. The approach is divided into
two phases. In the first phase, we train a CNN called
henceforth as signature network, responsible for ex-
tracting the camera signature from an image. The sec-
ond stage involves computing the similarity between
two image signatures. The similarity function is for-
mulated by training a neural network, which we call
similarity network.
A two-phase learning approach gives us the abil-
ity to independently fine tune signature extraction and
similarity comparison. The training of the networks
does not need the availability of ground truth noise
residuals. It, therefore, allows us to have a more prac-
tical approach, as forensic investigators will not have
access to the noise residuals for learning the camera
signatures.
3.1 Learning Phase I
The first phase in this approach begins with the train-
ing of a signature network, which is defined as fol-
lows.
Let the space of all RGB images be denoted by I.
The signature network is trained on a subset of im-
ages from I. The trained network is then truncated at
a features extraction layer (Layer # 5, labeled Dense
signature in Table 1), which we denote by fsig. It is a
feed-forward neural network function fsig : I× I→ S,
where S is a space of all signatures. We define the
signature extraction operation, as follows:
S = fsig(I) (1)
∀ I ∈ I, where S ∈ S.
The signature network consists of four convolu-
tional layers followed by two fully connected layers.
A summary of all these layers is shown in Table 1.
Note that the number of devices in the final fully con-
nected layer represents the number of camera models
Table 1: The proposed CNN architecture of the signature
network. It consisting of 4 blocks of convolutional layers
and 2 blocks of fully connected dense layers. The high-
lighted row indicates the layer at which we truncate the net-
work and use the resulting 1024-element feature vector as
signature.
# Layers Activation Dims Repeat
1
Conv 2d – 96×7×7
×1Batchnorm tanh –
Max pool – 3×3
Conv 2d – 64×5×5
×22,3 Batchnorm tanh –
Max pool – 3×3
4
Conv 2d – 128×1×1
×1Batchnorm tanh –
Max pool – 3×3
5 Signature tanh 1024 ×1
6 Dense tanh 200 ×1Dense softmax # devices
present in the training set. The variable fsig represents
the trained network truncated at block 5 (see Table 1).
This gives us a signature of 1024 elements in size.
3.2 Learning Phase II
The goal of the second phase is to map the signa-
tures of pairs of images to a similarity score that
gives an indication of whether the input pair comes
from the same or different source. To this extent, we
train a neural network in a Siamese fashion that deter-
mines the similarity between a pair of signatures ex-
tracted using the signature network. Let S1 and S2 be
two signatures extracted from the signature network;
S1 = fsim(I1) and S2 = fsim(I2). The labeled data for
training the similarity network is then generated ac-
cording to the following condition:
Slabel(S1,S2) =
1,
If I1 and I2 come from
the same source camera
0, otherwise
(2)
Figure 3: The proposed neural network architecture of the
Similarity Network.
The similarity network learns the mapping fsim :
S×S→ [0,1], and its architecture is depicted in Fig-
ure 3. The first layer is a fully connected dense layer
f c 1 containing 2048 neurons with ReLU activation,
which takes as input the signatures S1 and S2 of a
given pair of images. Then, we combine the outputs
from the first dense layer along with an element wise
multiplication of S1 and S2 into a single vector and
feed it to f c 2, which is a dense fully connected layer
with ReLU activations. This is finally connected to
a single neuron with a sigmoid activation. Once the
similarity network is trained, we can use both net-
works together in a pipeline to determine the simi-
larity for any given pair of input images.
score = fsim( fsig(I1), fsig(I2)) (3)
We experimentally determine a threshold η for the
score given by the network. The pairs of images
whose similarity score is above η are classified as
similar, otherwise as different.
4 PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTS
AND RESULTS
4.1 Dataset
We used the publicly available Dresden dataset (Gloe
and Bo¨hme, 2010) in our experiments for image
matching based on source camera identification. It
consists of images from various indoor and outdoor
scenes acquired under controlled conditions.
Many camera model identification approaches
have been presented but due to a lack of bench-
mark datasets, it is often hard to directly compare
the performance of different methods. The Dres-
den dataset was made available in 2010 and since
then it has seen widespread use in image foren-
sics that also go beyond source camera identifica-
tion. The Dresden dataset comes with three sub-
sets of data, one of which is called JPEG, which
was intended for the study of model specific JPEG
compression algorithms. The JPEG set consists of
1851 images taken by 34 different camera devices
that belong to 25 camera models. We discard the
three camera devices (FujiFilm FinePixJ50 0, Ri-
coh GX100 3, Sony DSC-T77 1) that contain only
one image each and work with the remaining 31 de-
vices. Though the content is limited to two indoor
scenes, it is of interest to understand the source cam-
era device identification in the presence of JPEG com-
pression artefacts. The other two subsets, which con-
sist of dark frames and natural images, were not con-
sidered in our study.
4.2 Experiments
In a random stratified manner, we used 70% of the
data for training and validation. The remaining 30%
of data was left for our tests.
In the first training phase the signature network
was trained for 15 epochs, with categorical cross en-
tropy as the loss function and stochastic gradient de-
scent (SGD) as the optimizer. For the optimization
task, we set the learning rate to 0.001, the momen-
tum to 0.95, and the decay to 0.0005. Convergence
was reached after the 5th epoch where the validation
loss started to fluctuate while the training loss re-
mained roughly the same, and we fixed the network
with weights obtained at the end of the 5th epoch. The
training was done on an NVIDIA RTX 2070 GPU.
All the extracted signatures were stored in a database,
which provided easy access in the second half of the
experiments.
In the second phase, where we train the similar-
ity network, we generated labeled pairs of signatures
according to Equation 2. All the 1294 (70% of the
full data set of 1851 images) training and validation
images used for learning the signature network gen-
erated 1294C2 pairs of labeled signatures data. The
similarity network was trained in a Siamese fashion
using binary cross entropy as the loss function along
with an SGD optimizer. The network was trained for
30 epochs, with a learning rate of 0.005 and a decay
factor of 0.5 for every 3 epochs.
For the systematic evaluation of the trained net-
work, we performed a series of experiments. A sin-
gle experiment involves choosing a pair of camera
devices and generating 100 random pairs of images
with replacement. Each pair consists of an image
from each of the two concerned camera devices. The
trained network was used to predict the similarity
score for each of the pairs. The similarity score is
converted to 1 (similar) or 0 (not similar) based on a
threshold which we determined from the evaluation
on the validation set. We set the threshold to 0.99 as
it provided the maximum F1-score on the validation
set. We normalized the resulting 100 scores by aver-
aging them in order to get a value between 0 and 1 for
the comparison of images coming from two camera
devices.
For evaluation of the network, we considered all
possible pairs of the 31 camera devices resulting in
a 31× 31 experiments. We used Algorithm 1 below
to generate a similarity matrix of 31× 31 elements,
where each element is the normalized similarity score
of the corresponding camera devices. Figure 4 shows
the resulting similarity matrix of our test data. The
overall accuracy is 85%.
Figure 4: Similarity matrix for the 31 camera devices in the test set. A score closer to 1 indicates a high similarity between
the images taken from the corresponding pairs of cameras. Similarity values along the diagonal correspond to the similarity
between images taken from the same cameras. Ideally, the similarity matrix has ones along diagonal, and zeros elsewhere.
Algorithm 1 Similarity matrix computation.
procedure SIMILARITY MATRIX
C←{C1,C2, ...,CN} . N cameras
for i← 1 : N and j← 1 : N do
Randomly sample 100 image pairs
from the subspace Ci×C j
Predict the Source Similarity for
the concerned 100 pairs of images
using Equation 3.
Compute the accuracy
end for
return accuracy for N×N experiments
end procedure
5 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE
WORK
As can be seen from Figure 4, in general, the model
is able to detect images coming from the same cam-
era devices. There are, however, some instances
where the network gets confused with images coming
from the same camera model. This can be seen with
camera models (Ricoh GX100 0, Ricoh GX100 1),
(Nikon D70 0, Nikon D70s 0). This could be be-
cause the same camera models are subject to the same
manufacturing process. Thereby, resulting in similar
imperfections or artefacts. We need to first investi-
gate the noise differences between the same camera
models, before trying to investigate the noise patterns
together from all the devices. This approach might
give us a better insight into the challenges between
the same camera models.
It is also evident that the devices from the brands
Agfa and Sony get confused with several other camera
devices in our evaluation. We suspect this is due to the
presence of a large number of images in the data set
coming from Agfa (around 25 percent), which may
have caused some bias in the learned networks. We
will address this problem by investigating different
approaches that deal with unbalanced training sets.
The approach that we propose mimics the prac-
tical situation faced by forensic experts, where they
only have a collection of images without knowing
their actual source. Among others, investigators are
interested to determine whether two or more images
were taken by the same camera, irrespective of what
camera it is. That information can help them identify-
ing the offender or to compile stronger evidence. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt that
addresses the problem of device-based image match-
ing.
6 CONCLUSIONS
From the results we achieved so far we conclude that
the proposed approach is promising for matching im-
ages based on their underlying sensor pattern noise.
We will continue our investigations and aim to im-
prove the method until it is robust enough to be de-
ployed as a forensic tool.
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